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Abstract 
The changing character of warfare, exemplified by the 
increasingly asymmetric and hybrid character of modern armed 
conflicts, presents complex challenges for the international legal 
framework regulating armed conflicts - Jus  ad Bellum  and Jus in 
Bello.  The key factor driving this change has been the growing 
involvement of non-State actors (combatants, insurgents, militants 
and terrorist groups) in armed conflicts. While acknowledging the 
normative progress made in articulating the principles of ‗ jus in 
bello‟, the paper highlights persistent and pervasive problems in the 
application of the law governing armed conflicts to battlefield 
situations. The article‘s key objective is to counsel the necessity for 
the further refinement and granulation of current ‗signature policies‘ 
involving the use of armed drones in targeting terror suspects. This 
task is undertaken with a view to attaining a greater degree of 
accuracy, clarity and precision in calibrating the vital distinction 
between civilian status and the various categories of presumed 
combatants. The paper posits the impossibility of attaining the rule of 
distinction in the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It 
further argues that when viewed from this perspective, the mere 
possession and stockpiling of WMDS could per se be construed as 
constituting the requisite mens rea, or animus belligerendi, of 
preparation for the possible future commission of war crimes. The 
concluding part of the paper outlines a possible conceptual 
framework for establishing war crimes culpability in the context of 
nuclear warfare. 
Keywords- International law; law of war; asymmetric warfare; 
IHL principle of distinction; war crimes. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Asymmetric warfare is a fairly old  phenomenon in  
humanity, with historic examples such as the epic b iblical 
contest pitting David versus Goliath still serving as an epithet 
for the unequal pairings of contestants in present-day sporting 
and battlefield episodes . However, there has been an 
acknowledged increase in both the number and the frequency 
of armed conflicts comprising some element of asymmetry; to 
wit, armed conflicts in which one of the sides enjoys an 
overwhelming military superiority over the adversary
1
. 
Ev identiary confirmation of th is increasing phenomenon can 
be deduced from the various coalitions in the ‗war against 
terror‘ to the wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Further 
evidence stem from hybrid conflicts which combine the 
elements of both conventional (symmetrical) and 
unconventional (asymmetric) warfare in Syria and the 
sporadic outbreaks of conflict along the Israeli border, with 
the militant groups Hezbollah and Hamas , in part icular, falling 
into the hybrid category of organizations capable of engaging 
in both types of warfare.  On the other hand, symmetry in  
armed conflict (generally understood to involve classic armed 
combat with open battle confrontations between regular State 
forces of roughly equal strength or evenly matched 
government troops) is becoming a rare phenomenon
2
. 
Furthermore, the armed conflicts of the 21
st
 century are
increasingly internalized  and ‗privatized‘ through the 
involvement of non-State actors such as militant groups and 
insurgents. Such conflicts do nonetheless have international 
ramifications which confer on them a higher degree of 
complexity than inter-State symmetrical warfare. It is this 
complexity, borne out of the inequality in the belligerents‘ 
military strength that often leads the weaker party to adopting 
unconventional tactics and strategies . Viewed  from a legal 
perspective, the ultimate outcome of such unconventional 
tactics is the use of unlawful methods of warfare, cu lminating 
in potential breaches of jus in bello norms including the key 
principle of distinction.  
The phenomenon of asymmetric and hybrid warfare poses 
complex challenges to regular armed forces in terms of finding 
adequate strategic and tactical responses. The traditional 
response has often been the deployment of counter-insurgency 
measures including covert operations involving the 
deployment of special forces.
3
 However, there is always a
danger when faced with the complex challenges of 
asymmetric and hybrid warfare that regular forces may resort 
to waging total or unrestricted warfare; or they may employ 
strategies such as ‗relentless pursuit‘ with the aim of 
countering the ‗hit and run‘ guerrilla warfare tactics used by 
insurgents. Counter-insurgency strategies and tactics could, in 
turn, lead to an over-reaction on the part of regular soldiers or 
special forces, including exactions on civilian population 
founded on the presumption of civilian part icipation in the 
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conflict. This in  turn might inevitably lead to a consequential 
blurring or even an erosion of the vital distinction between 
combatants and civilians. This is especially the case in ‗fog of 
war‟ scenarios when civilian populations may be viewed 
through the hazy lens of ‗presumed combatants ‘. It is this facet 
of the problem that this paper sets out to examine. The 
conceptual focus of the article is directed at a critique of the 
signature policies used for the profiling of terror suspects and 
presumed combatants in the war on terror and the implicat ions 
of such policies for the IHL principle of d istinction. It should 
perhaps be pointed out at this stage in the discourse that unlike 
a ‗personality strike‘ in which a known individual (e.g. a  
known terrorist or militant combatant) is the subject of the 
targeting, in a ‗signature strike‘ the precise identity of the 
targeted individual or group of indiv iduals is not known. 
Rather the targeting (by the medium of unmanned remotely  
controlled drones armed with Hellfire missiles) is based on a 
particular ‗signature policy‘ founded on specific traits and 
criteria which together generate and construct a profile for the 
target as a combatant (or more precisely a suspected terrorist 
or presumed combatant).  
II. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER
A review of academic literature on asymmetric warfare 
indicates that much of the discourse has been focused on 
analyzing the tactical
4
 and strategic
5
 aspects of the 
phenomenon. There have also been some studies conducted on 
the IHL
6
 and international human rights law implications of
asymmetric conflicts. However, none of these studies have 
dealt specifically with the IHL principle of d istinction and its 
application to signature policies. And although signature 
policies themselves have been studied in some depth there 
have not been any attempts made to link such policies with the 
IHL princip le of d istinction and the potential for breach of the 
norm in the use of signature policies. The specific  question 
concerning the targeting of presumed combatants through the 
deployment of armed drones and the implication of this 
battlefield strategy for the IHL principle of distinction thus 
presents a perceptible gap in the literature. It is this gap in the 
literature which this paper sets out to address.  
Part III of the paper briefly sets out the scope and 
limitat ions of the study. Part IV provides the fulcrum of the 
article  with an overview of some of the key issues by 
examining the main characteristics and features of asymmetric 
and hybrid armed conflicts, and the applicability of the rules 
of war to such conflicts. In Part V the research problem is 
identified and contextualized by examining the IHL principle 
of distinction against the background of asymmetric and 
hybrid conflicts. The focus of the discussion in this part is 
from the perspective of the regular forces engaged in 
asymmetric or hybrid  warfare. Part VI represents the fulcrum 
of the discourse. In  this part, the various signature policies are 
reviewed  and critiqued. Part VII sets to develop a theoretical 
or conceptual framework for potential war crimes culpability 
by establishing a link between nuclear defence strategy and  
and breach of jus in bello norms governing armed conflict. 
Parts VIII and IX conclude the paper with some key 
recommendations for law reform. 
III. SCOPE AND  LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The scope of this article is broadly limited to the 
prescriptive norms of jus in bello (i.e . permissive rights and 
prohibitions derived from positivist international law rules 
governing the conduct of warfare). Its focal perspective is 
anchored on the IHL principle of distinction, with this 
perspective further narrowed down to identify ing legal and 
practical prob lems associated with the applicat ion of the 
principle o f distinction in situations of asymmetric warfare. 
The scope of the discourse, therefore, does not extend to jus 
ad bellum (ru les governing the legal justification  or rationale  
for going to  war). It also does not cover international human 
rights law vis-à-vis the rules applicable to the treatment of 
non-combatants, civilian populations or prisoners of war. Nor 
does it extend to arguments underpinning the moral 
justification fo r waging war – i.e. the concept of ‗just war‘ in  
the Augustinian sense of jus bellum iustum. There is 
developing an-built tension in the two main approaches to 
combating terrorism vis-à-vis their applicability in given 
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situations – on the one hand is an armed conflict model based 
on IHL, and on the other an enforcement model applying the 
rules of IHRL. Exploring the nature, scope and possible 
solutions to this tension could provide opportunities for future 
research. 
IV. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
In 1648 the Peace Treaty of Westphalia sought to put an 
end to ‗private‘ wars in Europe conducted by non-State 
parties, thus designating the waging of warfare as a sovereign 
prerogative. The Westphalian model, therefore, conceived and 
prescribed armed conflict as an exclusively State preserve 
(sovereign prerogative) by putting an end to the ‗privatization‘ 
of war. In view of the geo-polit ical circumstances of the time 
(with a Europe comprising of nation states of roughly 
equivalent populations and sizes and with international 
relations guided by the doctrine of equality of States ) one of 
the main  products of Westphalia was eventual symmetry  in  
warfare. Th is is turn ushered in a prolonged period of 
approximate military parity in wars involving combat between 
government armies of roughly identical or equal military  
strength. Such wars proceeded on the basis of open 
confrontation at pre-selected geographically circumscribed 
battlefield locations, a fact evident from h istory lessons which 
often include repertoires (followed  by the indexing) of 
battlefield names and their associated dates.
7
This confining of the theater of conflict to a restricted area 
was particularly  favorable  to the customary norm which 
required d istinguishing between combatants and civilians. It is 
this State-based model of warfare that provided the premise 
for the Prussian military theorist and strategist General C.G. 
von Clausewitz in his Hegelian d ialect ical rendering of 
battlefield  strategies in h is two monographs : the ‗Principles of 
War‘ and ‗On War‘. The waging of war as a sovereign 
prerogative, and thus the exclusive preserve of statecraft, was 
equally the inspiration for the Rousseau-Portalis doctrine. In 
line with this doctrine, J -J Rousseau postulated that war does 
not involve a relationship between man and man, but between 
State and State, in which  the men who fight each other are not 
enemies except by accident (of polit ics); and they fight not as 
ordinary or private citizens , but as soldiers and defenders of 
the fatherland 
8
.
This State-based model of warfare and its attendant 
symmetry fits in rather well with the norms governing the 
conduct of armed conflicts, not least because of the 
foundational element of reciprocity in  the conduct of combat 
operations on which such wars were premised.  It  may even be 
argued that the norms of jus in bello (customary  norms, IHL 
principles and the Geneva conventions) are conceived and 
designed with the Westphalian model of inter-State warfare 
(and a fortiori symmetry) in mind. It is arguably for this 
reason that when applied  to asymmetric and hybrid conflicts, 
the norms of jus in bello tend to break down. Furthermore, the 
concepts of asymmetric and hybrid warfare challenge the very  
foundations of the Westphalian construct (through the 
involvement of non-State actors in the waging of armed 
conflict) as well as the Clausewitz conception of a battlefield  
strategy founded on symmetry. 
A. Asymmetric and Hybrid Armed Conflicts: An Overview.
The Westphalian model has given way once again to the 
‗privatizat ion‘ of warfare with the resurgence in the number 
and frequency of armed conflicts involved non-State actors. 
Asymmetric and hybrid wars often have a transgressive 
agenda which may  include effecting regime change, the 
violent pursuit of significant alterations in current government 
policy or the attainment of aspirational goals such as self-
determination or a religiously inspired transformational 
agenda involving State governance.  Unlike conventional 
state-on-state symmetrical wars, asymmetric and hybrid 
conflicts do not usually have a distinct beginning or structured 
ending in the form of a peace treaty or a formal agreement 
allocating to each side war gains or forfeitures. It is this 
intractability that confers on asymmetric and hybrid conflicts 
the character of wars of attrition which in turn can harbor 
disastrous consequences for IHL norms governing the conduct 
of warfare.  
Given the vast inequality in military strength and war 
resources between the belligerent parties, the defin ing 
hallmark of asymmetry  in  warfare is the protraction of the war 
through a strategy of low-intensity conflict  with the principal 
aim of wearing down the stronger adversary over time through 
war weariness. Viewed from the perspective of the weaker 
party, the primord ial and cardinal rule of engagement in 
asymmetric warfare is unsurprisingly the avoidance of open 
combat with a vastly superior adversary in a geographically  
circumscribed battlefield location, employing classic troop 
formations, or adopting conventional strategies and tactics in 
line with the Clausewitz principles for conducting warfare. For 
the most likely outcome of such a conventional approach 
would be the annih ilat ion of the weaker fo rces. To counter the 
superiority of the stronger adversary, non-State actors will 
traditionally resort to methods of waging war which attempt to 
leverage the weaknesses in their military structure and war 
resources
9
.
The late Chinese leader, Mao Tse-Tung, can be considered 
to be to asymmetric and hybrid armed conflicts what 
Clausewitz was to symmetrical warfare. As part of Maoist 
philosophy, he outlined the strategy for conducting war 
against a vastly superior military force. In h is view, insurgents 
and militant groups can only have a realistic p rospect of 
victory over militarily superior government forces if the 
conflict is maintained in a p rotracted state with low levels of 
violence over a lengthy duration. This low level of violence is 
calibrated as the ‗normal‘ or default  position and should be 
lowered in the face of any attempt by the superior fo rces to 
escalate the conflict. Th is de-escalation strategy has a 
dampening effect and helps to stifle the momentum of the 
adversary. One of the problems faced by the stronger 
adversary is that continuation of the escalation under these 
circumstances would be construed in the court of public 
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opinion as an excessive, disproportionate or indiscriminate use 
of force against a weaker foe. 
On the other hand, the weaker party should not lower the 
intensity of the war to the point of cessation of belligerent 
activities as this could snuff out the flame of the insurgency. 
They must continually agitate and harass the foe while 
avoiding an escalation to preserve the momentum of the 
conflict. It is precisely for this reason that non-State actors in 
asymmetric and hybrid wars hardly ever adhere fully to the 
terms of a ceasefire or truce agreement. Once the escalation 
campaign of the stronger adversary is over, the weaker party  
should then re-adjust its combat strategy back to the calibrated 
‗normal‘ of low-level p rotracted violence. In line with 
asymmetric/ hybrid  war strategy, escalation of the conflict by 
the weaker side only occurs when conditions seem favorable 
for a victorious conclusion to the conflict. This is when an 
‗end game‘ scenario is in sight or if the political environment 
is conducive to the negotiation of favorable terms to settle the 
conflict.  
From an IHL perspective, the Maoist philosophy differs 
from modern forms of asymmetric warfare in that with the 
former v iolence is aimed at a precise target (i.e. government 
forces), thus keeping the conflict within the threshold of 
distinction. Modern terror groups , on the other hand, are 
increasingly resorting to indiscriminate forms of urban warfare 
which include the targeting of civilians with unconventional 
weapons such as knives and vehicles. Apart from trying to 
wear down the enemy through combat fatigue, the rationale 
for protraction in contemporary asymmetric conflicts include 
taxing the resources of the superior military power by 
increasing security costs whilst undermin ing public 
confidence through war weariness - thus depleting public t rust 
in State power and institutions. The modus operandi for this 
strategy include ambushes, guerrilla warfare tactics, outbreaks 
of sporadic violence, the bombing of civilian infrastructure 
and high value economic targets, and spectacular attacks on 
highly symbolic targets . Suicide bombings, the use of 
improvised exp losive devices (IEDs), and ‗lone wolf‘ attacks 
conducted with the use of ‗sleeping cells‘ behind enemy lines 
or on enemy territory all constitute part of the armory of 
terrorist groups. As part of this strategy, non-State actors will 
also put in place a decentralized command structure, with 
organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIS known to source out 
their activities through ‗terror franchising‘. 10  This 
decentralization strategy has adverse implications for the 
enforcement of IHL, as renders difficult the attribution of 
responsibility if war crimes are committed. 
From an  IHL perspective the problem with asymmetric 
warfare resides in the fact that by shunning traditional open 
confrontation in favor of unconventional methods, non-State 
actors often resort to perfidious tactics to offset their 
comparative military disadvantage or weakness. These 
methods are known to include mingling with civilian 
populations and the occasional use of civilians as human 
shields with combatants disguising themselves as non-
combatants, thus blurring the threshold of distinction. It may 
thus be argued that deceit and a disdain for the rules of war are 
perceived by terrorist groups in particular as part and parcel of 
the armory fo r leveraging or redressing their comparat ive 
disadvantage in military strength. Asymmetric warfare 
operates on the principle of war waged anywhere and at any 
time. There is no geographically circumscribed battlefield. 
Terror groups such as al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and ISIS have 
even posited the universalizat ion or regionalizat ion (in the 
case of Boko Haram) of the theater of conflict parameters – 
i.e. a global or regional battlefield with a global audience. This 
strategy of regionalizat ion or universalization of what is in  
effect an  internal conflict  a priori has the potential to  erode or 
to even negative the rule on distinction through indiscriminate 
targeting of civilian populations and communities within the 
perceived universalized combat zone.  
Hybrid warfare combines the principal features of both 
asymmetric and symmetric  warfare, most notably in  the use of 
quasi-military formations. Groups with hybrid warfare 
capabilit ies can often engage in a simultaneous operational 
fusion of asymmetric and symmetric combat techniques with 
the aim of achiev ing strategic and tactical synergy in the 
mobilization of war assets and resources. The expected 
outcomes of hybrid mult i-modal war strategy are the 
realization of synchronous and synergistic effects which can 
be pivotal to promoting the overall war effort
11
. Illustrative 
examples of o rganizat ions with hybrid war capabilities include 
al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas , and 
ISIS. The military response of regular forces to these 
unconventional strategies is often to employ counter-
insurgency measures, including covert operations, which 
could equally  have potentially negative impacts on the IHL 
principle of distinction. 
B. The Applicability of „Jus in Bello‟ to Asymmetric and
Hybrid Armed Conflicts.
Given that asymmetric and hybrid  armed conflicts do not
subscribe to the basic tenets of the Clausewitz construct of war 
or with the tradit ional concepts of IHL, this raises questions as 
to whether the humanitarian challenges they pose are 
adequately met by  the current norms of jus in bello. For if 
state-on-state symmetric warfare is becoming a thing of the 
past, it is equally arguable that the laws of war which were 
conceived and designed with such conflicts in mind are also 
becoming obsolete. The guiding principle o f jus in bello is that 
wartime conduct and operations should be solely aimed  at 
achieving the objects of the war. This means that only 
legitimate war objectives should be pursued. Thus attacks on 
civilians or civilian objects, the use of disproportionate, 
indiscriminate, o r gratuitous violence, would  be amount to 
illegal conduct. 
IHL norms apply to all types of wars irrespective of their 
actual character as long as the conflict in  question can be 
categorized as an ‗armed conflict‘. This becomes the case 
GSTF Journal of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS) Vol.7 No.1, 2018
©The Author(s) 2018. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
4
when separate or isolated attacks mounted by a well-structured 
organization crystalize to produce synergistic effects. The 
criterion of o rganizat ional structure is pivotal to the attribution 
of responsibility for any breaches of IHL norms, and this , in 
turn, requires a hierarch ical, top-down group with defined 
positions and roles, including a command structure and an 
operational code of conduct. In the case of The Prosecutor v 
Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia (ICFY)  defined the term ―armed  conflict‖ as 
existing ―whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between government 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a state.‖12
The norms of jus in bello thus only apply to wartime 
conduct. And they apply to all types of armed conflicts 
regardless of their nature or character – i.e. to asymmetric and 
hybrid as well as symmetrical armed conflicts. It  is worth 
noting that reciprocity (or the expectation thereof) is not a pre-
requisite or a requirement for the binding force of IHL norms 
of jus in bello. It would, however, be deemed unreasonable 
and unrealistic to expect that IHL norms should apply to a 
purely localized  conflict such as inter-tribal conflict or to a 
village land dispute which results in casualties, 
notwithstanding the level of vio lence involved. Such conflicts 
can more appropriately be dealt with under national law.  The 
principles governing the law of warfare are peremptory norms 
of international law. From an  international law perspective jus 
in bello rules constitute jus cogens and can arguably be seen in 
the light of obligations erga omnes (owed towards all). It is for 
this reason that their breach, constituting a war crime, is 
assigned to the category of a ‗crime against humanity‘ – thus 
attracting the procedural precept of universal jurisdiction. In  
an advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice has 
postulated that the jus in bello principle of d istinction is 
fundamental to IHL and can therefore be considered as a 
cardinal rule of international law
13
.
C. The Erosive impact of modern advances in warfare
technologies on the IHL principle of distinction.
Since the introduction of aerial combat in the early 20
th
-
century technology has made significant inroads into the way 
warfare is conducted. New generation technologies (guided 
missiles systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV or Reaper 
drones), smart bombs, IEDS, encrypted mobile phones, etc.) 
now form an integral part of battlefield strategy and combat 
tactics. But although many studies have examined the impact 
of technology on the conduct of modern warfare
14
, the specific 
question regarding the potentially erosive impact of new 
battlefield  technologies on the threshold of distinction remains 
either unexplored or under-explored. Aerial warfare in  
particular, with its associated lexicon of ‗co llateral (civ ilian) 
damage‘, has an irrefutable potential to blur o r even erase the 
essential distinction between military and civilian targets, and 
between civilians and combatants. UAVs are increasingly 
being deployed on bombing missions by government forces as 
well as by insurgents and combatants, with both ISIS and 
Peshmerga forces known to be using commercial versions of 
UAVs for bombing missions in early 2017 in the battle for 
Mosul
15
.
It is submitted, from the perspective of IHL, the 
increasing use of remotely  controlled weapons systems poses 
a significant threat of erosion to the threshold of distinction 
given the potentially indiscriminate impacts of these systems 
which may  extend to the inadvertent targeting of civilian 
objects and communit ies. Remotely controlled weapons 
systems increase the potential for mistakes , which, in turn, 
may cu lminate in the unintentional targeting of civilian objects 
or populations. This is a possible war crime if the burden of 
proof relat ing to the exercise of due diligence in the conduct of 
combat operations cannot be discharged. The potentially  
erosive impact of new generation war technologies and 
weapons systems remains a concern which as yet has not been 
sufficiently addressed even with the advent and deployment of 
so-called ‗smart weapons‘ systems. In the meantime , the 
continuing evolution in technological warfare continues to 
reveal its more insidious and pervasive traits vis-à-vis its 
potentially harmful effects on civilians. Cyber warfare in  
particular, no matter how well targeted, carries with it a  
virulent toxicity which can inflict indiscriminately in jurious 
impacts well beyond the intended target by infecting civilian 
computer systems even in neutral countries or venues. 
These modern developments concerning advances in war 
technology pose significant challenges for the application of 
the IHL norms of jus in bello in a contemporary context in as 
much as there have not been any corresponding developments 
in the legal framework aimed at addressing these challenges in 
line with advances in the conduct of warfare.  
V. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM WITH THE IHL PRINCIPLE
OF DISTINCTION IN ASYMMETRIC AND HYBRID ARMED 
CONFLICTS: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS. 
A. The Protective Function of IHL and the Threshold of 
Distinction.
The primary objective o f the IHL principle of d istinction is
to protect civilians and civilian objects during armed conflict. 
This implies that only individuals who  are exercising a 
continuous combatant function (CCF) through their 
membership of an organized armed group, or those taking a 
direct part in hostilit ies  (DPH), can be d irect ly targeted or 
attacked.  In symmetric warfare enlisted uniformed  soldiers of 
regular armed forces (trad itional State armies) fit easily into 
the former group and can be identified with certainty as 
combatants in the CCF category. However, the threshold of 
distinction tends to break down in situations of asymmetric 
and hybrid warfare when indiv iduals with a notional civilian 
status periodically engaged in armed combat. An illustrative 
example would be seasonal recruits who join the Afghan 
Taliban for the so-called Spring offensive which marks the 
start/ resurgence of insurgency following the winter lu ll in  
fighting. These perennial recru its then return to their normal 
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civilian occupations (farmers, shepherds, tailors, shopkeepers, 
drivers, teachers, etc.) at the beginning of the summer season. 
The IHL threshold of distinction becomes blurred when 
applied to such individuals. Th is is likewise the case with 
police officers, members of militia , the personnel of 
paramilitary organizations, and reservists who can only be 
targeted when exercising a DPH function. 
In line with the IHL principle of distinction, civ ilians 
(including persons with a notional civilian status) can only be 
legally targeted or attacked if they are taking a direct part in 
hostilit ies (i.e . within the time frame if and when they assume 
DHP status). In other words, they can only be targeted at the 
point in time when they are engaging in hostile activit ies or 
armed conflict.  Once they resume their civ ilian status , they 
cannot be targeted. The appropriate approach would be arrest 
and prosecution under relevant provisions of national law. 
However, membership of an organized armed group such as 
al-Qaeda or ISIS could per se be considered as assigning to 
the individual concerned a CCF status similar to an enlisted 
soldier in a regular army. A CCF status makes a person a 
legitimate military target in wart ime; in addition, a CCF can 
be subject to an attack by enemy forces anywhere and at any 
time
16
. This can be the case if the indiv idual concerned has a 
long-standing assimilation or association with  an armed  
insurgency or terrorist group through recruitment, 
membership, training and being equipped by the organization 
for the purpose of d irect  engagement in  hostilit ies. However, 
such engagement has to be in  a continuous manner rather than 
on a spontaneous or sporadic basis or through unorganized 
participation.  An indiv idual with a CCF status only ceases to 
become a legit imate target when they put themselves ‗hors de 
combat‘ (or out of combat) through demobilization or 
retirement  from active service and re-integration into civilian 
life. In the context of IHL, four groups of persons are 
identifiable when establishing the threshold of distinction; the 
four categories, in decreasing order of IHL level of protection, 
are: 
 Civilians, who have a fully protected status under the 
IHL principle of d istinction and should not be 
targeted or be subject to attack;
 DPH (persons involved in d irect part icipation in
hostilit ies): an act ivity-based category, individuals in
this group are in principle considered to be civilians ,
in so far as they are not established members of any
armed organizat ion; they can thus only be targeted
when engaging in belligerent activ ities  – i.e. partial 
protection.
 CCF (continuous combatant function): belonging to
the status-based category of a functional or active
combatant; they can, therefore, be the subject of an
attack anywhere and at any time, meaning that 
targeting need not be restricted to a geographically
circumscribed battlefield zone; however, they are
accorded some level of protection, most notably as
prisoners of war (POW) when captured in combat.
 Spies: do not benefit from the protections accorded
by IHL as espionage is not considered to be 
legitimate activ ity in the conduct of warfare (hence
the customary epitaph of ‗executed at dawn‘).
However, spies are subject to protections under 
(international) human rights law (IHRL) regarding
their treatment when in captivity.
The threshold of distinction tends to break down when an 
individual in the DPH group is targeted outside the specific 
time-frame when they are involved in  belligerency. US 
military policy, in part icular, has historically and in practice 
adopted the view that all the participants of terro rist 
organizations such as al-Qaeda and its associated forces are in 
fact exercising the CCF function - and in view of this status 
they are targetable anywhere and at any time.
17
 However, 
depending on the organization and its nature, membership can 
be differentiated into various categories. In traditional state 
armed forces, membership is based on the employment of a 
uniformed individual within the organizat ion. Members are  
therefore easily identifiable.  However, with non-State, non-
uniformed combatant groups, it could be argued that a more 
appropriate criterion for targeting would be a functional or 
activity-based status in that an individual takes or gives orders 
in a central and hierarch ical chain of command, or takes a 
direct part in hostilit ies . If the group is a purely military  
organization similar to a traditional state army in that their 
primary activity is militant in nature (e.g. ISIS), then the 
targeting of group members should be a lawfu l military  
objective in line CCF functionality. Even so, direct targeting 
of such a group should be limited to exclusively military  
assets and installations that are not civilian objects. However, 
in asymmetric warfare, the problem of distinction is further 
compounded by the fact that combatants and military objects 
frequently inter-mingle with civ ilian populations and civilian 
objects, with militants using social occasions such as 
weddings, family reunions and funerals for the holding of 
informal meetings and consultations  
Under Article 51(3) of API, civilians are not 
targetable unless at a time when they are taking a direct  part in  
hostilit ies
18
.  The ICRC guidelines provide that a civilian can
be considered to be a DPH if the act he is performing is likely  
to significantly affect the military  operations or the capacity of 
a party to the armed conflict, or if such actions inflict  harm on 
persons or objects protected from direct attack. Th is does not 
require the materialization of harm, only an object ive 
likelihood of it. When an act is reasonably expected to 
adversely affect military operations or the military capacity of 
a party to the conflict, it would have satisfied the threshold 
requirement, and the person who is engaging in the said act 
can thus become a legitimate target of an attack under the 
DHP category. 
B. Establishing the Nexus of Belligerent Activity for the DPH
Category.
Participation in hostilities can either be direct or indirect.
Participation on an indirect basis involves taking part in war 
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sustaining activities as opposed to directly contributing to the 
general war effo rt. With direct part icipation,  an individual 
actually engages in conduct which has the likelihood of 
actualizing the materialization of the threshold of harm 
required, whereas indirect part icipation only contributes to a 
mere maintenance or build-up of the capacity required  for 
causing such harm. For d irect participation, there should be a 
sufficiently close causal link between the act and resulting 
harm which confers on the indiv idual the status of a DPH. The 
act must form an  essential part  of such an organized military  
operation. It should also be one causal step away from the 
actualizat ion of harm as opposed to a gradual build-up of 
actions. For the latter, arrest and prosecution provide a more 
lawful alternative to targeting in an armed attack 
To be considered a DPH, there must, therefore, be a 
belligerent nexus or connection. This requirement is met when 
an act is exp licit ly designed to cause the required direct harm 
in support of one party to the detriment of another. To 
establish the belligerent nexus is a challenging task, but one 
should deduce from objectively  verifiable factors or evidence 
whether the conduct of a civilian in the given circumstances, 
time and place can reasonably be interpreted to be an act in 
support of one belligerent party to the detriment of another by 
directly causing harm to the latter
19
. When applied together, 
the three requirements (based on the threshold of harm, direct 
causation and belligerent nexus) enable an appropriate 
distinction to be made between civ ilians or purely civilian 
objects on the one hand and, on the other hand, civilians and 
civilian  objects which are taking a direct  part in hostilit ies (i.e. 
civilian DPH). Whereas the former is protected under the IHL 
principle o f distinction the latter is not and can thus become 
the legitimate target of a signature policy strike but only 
within the time frame when they are embarking on the DPH 
function. 
As already seen the principle o f distinction is a card inal 
rule of jus in bello which provides protection for civilians 
from wartime attack. Art icle 57(2) of API stipulates that if a 
belligerent plans or decides to attack a target, they are under a 
duty to ensure that the object of the attack is not a civilian  or a 
civilian object. If there is any doubt whatsoever as to whether 
a person is a CCF or DPH, Article 50(1) of API lays down a 
presumption to the effect that they should be considered to be 
a civ ilian and, therefore , not be subject to attack. Similarly, 
this presumption applies to objects such as places of worship, 
houses or other dwellings and facilit ies habitually used in a 
civilian capacity. 
An associated problem concerns the difficulty of attain ing 
a specific and precise definition of who a civilian or civilian 
object is in the context of armed conflict. This is because the 
focus has always been on defining what a military  objective is 
for the purposes of what may be legally targeted.
20
 In this
regard Article 52(2) of API provides that attacks are strictly 
limited to military objectives. Military objectives are limited 
to objects that by their ―nature, location, purpose or use… 
[make an effective contribution to the military action] …and 
whose total or part ial destruction, capture or neutralization… 
[would offer] …a definite military advantage.‖  
Viewed from the perspective of the princip le of d istinction, 
the problem with counter-insurgency policies or anti-terrorism 
covert operations stems from the fact all suspected operatives 
and associated groups (of al Qaeda or ISIS), for instance) 
together with their facilit ies are viewed as purely military  
objectives. This view runs counter to the requirement to 
distinguish between the CCF and DPH categories. Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS at their cores are widely regarded to be exclusively 
military or combatant organizations. However, some Al-
Qaeda affiliated groups such as the Somali group al-Shabaab 
or the Afghan Taliban are not. Al-Shabaab, for example, 
engages in insurgency as well as in civ il matters relating to 
administration and governance. The organization has a mix of 
civilian and military functionalit ies.
21
 There are many Al-
Shabaab operatives who exercise exclusively administrative or 
judicial offices and functions – i.e. who hold wholly civilian 
membership of the group. Some al-Shabaab facilities also 
have a wholly civ ilian function. The correct  approach vis-à-vis 
the latter would be arrest and prosecution rather than military  
targeting unless when they are known to be exercising a DPH 
function at the time of the attack. 
It is also worth pointing out that in line with the principle 
of distinction Article 50(3) of API provides that the presence 
of a military  objective in its midst does not deprive the civilian 
population within the area of its civilian status and protection 
from direct attack. However, Article 51(7) of API does not 
confer immunity on an area to protect it from being targeted 
due to the presence of a civilian population. When considered 
together, there seems to be an inherent contradiction in  these 
two provisions. However, it ought to be noted that there are 
some in-built precautionary measures  included in Article 57(2) 
of API which require that an attack should be canceled or 
suspended where such an attack would be disproportionate to 
the direct military advantage expected if there is a high 
probability that it would cause incidental loss of life, inju ry or 
damage to civilian objects - i.e. if the potential for collateral 
damage is seen to outweigh the military gains from an attack, 
then such an attack should be aborted.  
The principle of distinction thus establishes with varying 
degrees of clarity the threshold for what kinds of attacks are 
acceptable when dealing with different categories of persons 
or with a mix of civilian and military organizations. The 
principle o f distinction, with its key objective of protecting 
civilians in times of conflict, requires civilian status 
presumptions and verifications of targets when in doubt. This 
implies that assailants must gather sufficient and reliable 
evidence regarding the groups being targeted and must 
exercise the utmost duty of care towards the civilian 
population. In the meantime, the problem of distinction is 
increasingly being exacerbated by the involvement of groups 
previously viewed as exclusively civilian – most notably 
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through the forced conscription of child soldiers by terror 
groups, the increasing deployment of female personnel to 
frontline combat duties, and the frequent usage by terror 
groups of under-age suicide bombers. 
C. Breach of the IHL Principle of Distinction: Evidentiary
Questions and the Burden of Proof.
Battlefield commanding officers do not usually possess
personal knowledge of the specific nature and character of a 
military objective that is about to be the object of an attack. 
They must, therefore, rely on information provided from 
another source such as the military intelligence section or the 
reconnaissance unit attached to battlefield command.  Where 
the commanding officer is in doubt as to the precise nature of 
an object, they should request additional in formation to 
determine precisely whether the object in question is of 
military interest.
22
 However, the selection of an object of
attack remains the decision of the commanding officer. The 
final decision will be based on their knowledge and the 
informat ion available to them prior to the attack being carried 
out. The value to be placed on the information available is to 
be left to the expertise and discretion of the commanding 
officer as long as they exercise this discretion in a reasonable 
manner in light of available evidence. 
When deciding whether or not a decision is  reasonable, a  
minimum amount or quantum of information is required on 
the basis of which such a decision can be made. However, 
there is no defined standard for determin ing the amount or the 
quality of evidence or informat ion which would suffice as the 
basis for making a reasonable decision to attack. This raises 
the question as to the required threshold of informat ion – i.e. 
what amount of ‗minimum‟ in formation or evidence is 
required in order to render a decision reasonable for the 
purposes of establishing a target as a military objective. Under 
international criminal law if an attack is knowingly and 
intentionally perpetrated on civilians or civilian objects  this 
would constitute a breach of the IHL principle of distinction.
23
Any commander who willfully chooses, or ignores 
informat ion which could  have avoided the direct targeting of 
civilians or civ ilian ob jects, has in effect vio lated the principle  
and this could lead to the commission of a war crime. 
However, to establish unlawful conduct or illegality , the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt  that there 
was no rational justificat ion for viewing the target as a lawful 
military objective
24
. Proof of intent will require establishing
that the decision to attack the target was unreasonable and 
amounted to improper conduct on the part of the commanding 
officer.
25  
It is worth  noting that the increase in the number and 
frequency of asymmetric conflicts has been matched by a 
corresponding frequency and increase in the use of ‗signature 
policies‘ to target suspected militants in the war against 
terroris m. This is notwithstanding the high burden of proof 
which is required under the IHL principle o f distinction for the 
targeting of presumed combatants or terror suspects. 
VI. THE EROSIVE POTENTIAL OF ‗SIGNATURE POLICIES‘ ON
THE IHL PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION: A CRITIQUE.
The war on terror has been and is still being conducted both 
openly and covertly. When employed on the international 
stage to combat terroris m, covert operations raised some 
questions relating to jus in bello. Such operations also have 
implications for international criminal law if covert  operations 
result in the commission of war crimes. Foremost amongst the 
covert operations which have raised the most concern among 
jurists are strikes carried out by unmanned drones armed with 
Hellfire missiles against militant targets. From a legal 
perspective, drone strikes can be classified into two categories: 
(a) direct, or ‗personality‘, strikes where the identity of the 
target or victim is either known or verifiable to the assailant; 
and (b) ‗signature strikes‘, in which the identity of the target is
not known but the suspect is deemed to exhibit the ‗signature
behavior‘ of a combatant or terrorist; in other words, the target
displays suspicious patterns of conduct which are adjudged to
correspond to the trademark characteristics and demeanour of
a terrorist. Targets in the first category can be classified under
the CCF category. To be considered legal, strikes conducted
against targets in the second category must qualify as either a
CCF or a DPH signature strike.
Signature strike targets are typically males of between 20-
40 years of age - i.e. males of combat or military age 
(otherwise known as the MAM signature policy). From an 
IHL perspective the problem with ‗signature policies‘ stems 
from the fact that there have been some high-profile cases in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in which the victims of US signature 
strikes have turned out not to be combatants or terrorists but 
civilians. In a well-publicized incident which took place on 17 
March, 2011, a meeting of tribal leaders or ‗jirga‘ was 
targeted in the town of Datta Khel in the Waziristan province 
of Pakistan with the loss of 42 civilian lives. No matter how 
well planned and executed, signature strikes do have the 
potential to  erode the threshold of d istinction. The design, 
planning, and execution of signature policies are in themselves 
exercises fraught with considerable complexity and  difficu lty 
from a strategic, military and technical point of view. There 
are also political considerations and legal obstacles which 
require addressing as a pre-requisite to the successful 
execution of signature policies, not least the political and 
diplomatic ramificat ions which could ensue from a perceived 
act of sovereign trespass in the airspace of another country. 
There is a widely held v iew (especially amongst human 
rights lawyers and humanitarian organizations) that signature 
strikes are tantamount to illegal targeting, with civilian deaths 
being the inevitable consequence of such signature policies. 
This argument is partly  founded on the occasionally erroneous 
assumptions which can be made in the course of executing 
signature policies, especially when targeting is based on 
flawed military  intelligence. There is also the problem relat ing 
to the technical limitations of drone operations concerning the 
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correct identification of leg itimate military targets or 
objectives.
26
 A combination of these two factors and their 
contribution towards erroneous targeting of civilians thus 
raises the question as to whether signature strikes are 
potentially a breach of one of the most fundamental principles 
of IHL, the principle of distinction. As already noted the 
principle of d istinction requires belligerents to distinguish 
between military targets and civilian objects. Article 3 (which 
is common to the Geneva Conventions
27
) is considered to be a 
miniature convention in itself. This article provides basic 
protections for civilians and individuals who are ‗hors de 
combat‟; it applies to all forms of armed conflicts. The 
principle is of v ital importance and relevance when 
considering the legality or otherwise of signature strikes by 
armed Reaper drones. 
Notwithstanding the arguments outlined above, there are 
nonetheless circumstances in which an individual may  be 
lawfully targeted under a signature policy on grounds of 
exhibit ing DPH behavioral traits. This is in light of the fact 
that there seems to be have been a shift in position by IHL 
from status-based to conduct or activity-based targeting. This 
means that in  principle s ignature policies can  be said to  be 
broadly in line with IHL. However, the failure of IHL to 
address issues regarding the amount or quantum/quality of 
informat ion required for distinguishing targets means that 
even when individuals are targeted, the determination of 
whether the decision was reasonable does not rest on a precise 
or determinable  amount of evidence. This , in turn, dilutes the 
process of ascertaining whether there was sufficient evidence 
to relinquish any civilian protection for the purpose of 
certify ing that the target is either exclusively (or at  the time of 
targeting) was engaged in direct military  activity and therefore 
legally subject to attack. As already seen the position of the 
US government, fo r example, is that Al-Qaeda and its 
associated groups are exclusively military organizat ions by 
nature – i.e. all of its operatives and facilit ies fall into the CCF 
category. Such a broad assumption creates the potential for 
eroding the threshold of distinction especially  in  cases which 
could be more appropriately classified under the DPH 
category.
28
 This is in view of that fact that the latter status
combines within  it  the character of both a combatant and a 
civilian depending on what the individual is doing at any 
given moment in t ime. In other words, being a hybrid status , it 
provides the flexibility required  in  situations where there is a 
dearth of compelling evidence required for the establishment 
of a CCF status. Where the individual returns to their civilian 
status they ought to be immune from attack under the principle 
of distinction, with arrest and prosecution rather than an armed 
attack being the appropriate legal measure to take against 
them. 
Signature policies are manifestly founded on the profiling  
of suspects, based as they are on factors such as gender, age 
and geographical location coupled with the exh ibition of 
certain behavioral traits and characteristics that are associated 
with terrorist activity or conduct. When assessing the legality 
of such policies there are two questions to ask: first, was the 
particular signature policy sufficient from a legal (IHL) 
perspective to establish an acceptable object or target? 
Secondly, was the ev idence sufficient to  verify that the 
individual or object targeted was engaging in signature 
behavior? Once satisfied that the policy is legal the next  step 
must thus be to consider the factual question. The factual 
question requires that verification must be attained and the 
commanding officer must ensure that the action taken is 
against a military objective. These two questions are also 
subject to precautionary measures, presumptions, and 
protections afforded to civilians and civilian objects. Failure to 
prove the legality of the first question, or the evidentiary 
burden of the second, would render the signature-based attack 
illegal. 
A. Potentially Illegal‟Signature Policies‟.
In his comprehensive study, Kevin J. Heller reviewed 
14 types of signature policies which US government officials 
believe are in accordance with IHL and the principle of 
distinction.
29
 The policies can be grouped into three types: 
legal, potentially  illegal and hybrid categories. Amongst the 
legal policies are strikes or attacks aimed at known combatants 
(CCFs). In the second and third categories are strikes aimed  at 
individuals who are in the process of carrying out an attack 
(DPHs). A lso included in these categories strikes against 
persons transporting weaponry (classed as a legitimate 
military target under Article 52(2) of API); individuals 
handling exp losives and IEDs; and attacks against terrorist/ 
insurgent compounds and military  facilities, including train ing 
camps. 
But as seen above there are also signature policies 
which can  have a potentially erosive impact on the threshold 
of distinction. Most prominent amongst these is the MAM 
(military aged male) signature policy. Based on profiling 
criteria combining both gender and geographical location any 
male of military age (20-40 years who is present in an area of 
known terro rist or insurgency activity (i.e. combat theater) can 
be targeted by armed drones. Thus under the MAM signature 
policy, all men of military or combat age who happen to be 
inside a strike zone area are presumed to be combatants and 
are therefore targetable (unless intelligence proves otherwise) . 
The rationale for this signature policy is based on the 
questionable logic that men of military age in an area under 
the control of militants are ‗…probably up to no good.‘ 30
However, the premise for this logic is suspect in as 
much as it  founded on an evidence-free presumption. 
Therefore it is not surprising that commentators have been 
highly critica l of such a signature policy.
31
 The status of an
individual cannot, and should not, be inferred simply due to 
their geographical location at any particular point in time. This 
argument applies a fortiori in  asymmetric warfare where there 
is no defined battlefield. Under the MAM signature policy 
vast areas of Afghanistan such as Helmand province, northern 
Iraq, north-eastern Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria and much of 
Somalia could all be considered battlefield zones . 
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Consequently, any male within the age range of 20-40 years 
could thus be subject to attack by armed drones simply by 
being in the area. This is notwithstanding the fact that they 
may  not even be conscious of the fact that the zone forms part  
of a combat theatre. Even where the area in question is subject 
to martial law or is under a state of emergency, the appropriate 
measure to take would be arrest and prosecution rather than 
armed targeting. And what about MAMs whose homes are 
actually located with in designated combat area? The 
prejudicial nature of the MAM policy is also highlighted by 
the fact that it  appears to be based on a presumption of guilt  
rather than innocence.  
Other criteria used for the ‗MAM‘ signature policy 
such as the gender, age or any other abs tract affiliat ions of the 
targeted individual appear to be both arbitrary and subjective. 
There is also the technical p roblem relating to a drone 
operator‘s ability to accurately determine the age group of a 
target simply from the video streaming of images  relayed to 
the base station by an armed drone. It could thus be argued 
that such a policy is inconsistent with the IHL principle of 
distinction which requires that status -based targeting of an 
individual should be based on clear evidence which identifies 
the target as having either a CCF or DPH status . In principle, 
the MAM status seems far removed from the legal 
requirements of belligerent nexus or connection. It is, 
therefore, for th is reason that a status-based signature policy 
which relies exclusively on criteria such as geographical 
location, gender, and age of the target (without further 
evidence to show that the indiv idual in  question is a CCF or 
DPH) can be considered to be unlawfu l. This is because it has 
the undesired and potentially  dangerous effect of b lurring the 
vital distinction between a civilian and a combatant. 
Other potentially illegal policies include the targeting 
of consorts and known associates of combatants and terrorists. 
There is a parallel to be drawn here with exactions carried out 
against civilian populations as part of counter-insurgency 
operations on the basis that the targeted community is 
suspected of providing financial, material o r moral support to 
the insurgents, or otherwise shield ing the latter from capture. 
From a legal point of view, it can be argued that there is no 
causal link between consorting or association and promoting 
the war effort of insurgents and militants. Furthermore, 
consorting/ association is not specifically  intended or designed 
to have any adverse impact on one belligerent against another, 
nor does it qualify as a DPH activity.  Association with known 
terrorist or consorting, even if it  amounts to sympathizing with 
the terrorists‘ cause, does not make an individual targetable 
although they could be the subject of a prosecution under 
relevant national laws. The UN has confirmed that as long a 
person does not participate directly in combat, they maintain  
their civilian status and protections.
32
 In the Fofana and
Kondewa case, the Special Court for Sierra Leone ruled that 
collaborating with an armed group does not deprive an 
individual o f their civ ilian status in order to render them 
targetable. Likewise, indirect ly supporting or failing to resist 
an invading force does not make someone a part icipant in  
hostilit ies.
33
 It is on these grounds that a signature policy
which targets associates and consorts of terrorist would  be 
considered to be illegal and a breach of IHL principles. 
Also questionable is the signature policy which 
involves the targeting of armed convoys of men traveling in  
the war zone (similar to the MAM). It was held by the 
International Criminal Court in the Simić case 34  that the 
possession of weapons does not per se establish reasonable 
doubt as to the civilian status of the possessor, until such a 
time that they become a DPH. The men could well be armed  
for self-protection or self-defence. However, if the armed  
group is traveling towards an active combat zone, they could 
be targeted under the DPH category if it can be proven that 
they are heading towards a particular destination for the 
purpose of engaging in a specific belligerent or hostile act.  
Other signature policies which may raise cause for 
concern include the following: 
- targeting of suspected trainers of insurgents/ 
terrorists (outside the time frame of the train ing
activities);
- persons suspected of undergoing training for the
purpose of jo ining an insurgent or terrorist
group;
- the targeting of suspicious militant camps or
facilit ies; the targeting of known or suspected
facilitators and sponsors; and,
- the targeting of locations classified as ‗rest areas‘
for combatants or terrorists.
The operational aspects of armed drone warfare have 
raised further concerns about their possible impact on the 
threshold of distinction. The tediousness and boredom which 
can result from a drone operator sitting and staring at a screen 
for long periods of t ime watching live video footage as the 
UAV sends back images from the theater of conflict can have 
a debilitating psychological effect which in turn could impair 
the mental judgment of the operator. A lternatively, the 
excitement and expectation of registering a ‗first (or a fresh) 
kill‘ could implant into the mind of the drone operator a ‗video 
game‘ syndrome, with consequentially adverse impacts for the 
threshold of distinction. In the next section of the paper some 
recommendations are proffered as a prelude to the concluding 
remarks. 
VII. A WAR CRIME IN THE MAKING? ‗JUS IN BELLO‘ 
IN THE CONTEXT OF NUCLEAR WARFARE 
Unlike other WMDs such as biological and chemical 
weapons, positive international law does not expressly 
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in war. This 
acknowledgement seemingly puts to the test the proposition 
made in this paper that the mere possession of WMDs, 
including nuclear weapons, could be deemed to constitute the 
mens rea for a putative war crime. However, the proposition is 
grounded on the premise that the use, or threat of use, of 
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nuclear weapons would amount to a breach of IHL norms such 
as the principles of distinction, proportionality, military  
necessity and humanity. 
The use of nuclear weapons in any context would 
amount to a palpable breach of the principle of d istinction by 
virtue of the widespread, devastating and indiscriminate effect 
which the detonation of a nuclear device would have on the 
human population. The impact of the use of nuclear weapons 
is remove the civilian protections conferred by IHL while 
calling into question the validity of any justifications for their 
use based on military necessity. It is on this basis that the mere 
possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons is deemed to 
constitute the requisite mental element for the future 
commission of a war crime. It is this recognition which a  
priori renders the use of nuclear weapons unlawful under the 
customary international law norms of jus in bello. Th is in  turn 
provides an ipso facto rationale for validating long-standing 
arguments advocating global nuclear disarmament or 
denuclearization. 
The ‗mens rea‟ proposition is further reinforced by the 
IHL prohibit ion against attacks on adversaries (e.g. the 
wounded
35) who are ‗hors de combat‟ at the time of the attack; 
further support for the proposition can also be drawn from the 
prohibition against the use of weapons which inflict 
unnecessary and inhumane suffering. Moreover, the principle 
of proportionality implies that the use of force in self-defense 
pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter should be restricted 
to repelling acts of aggression, and should thus be conditioned 
by self-restraint.  However, it could be argued that such an 
intuitive and measured sense of proportionality would be 
impossible to attain in  the event that nuclear weapons are used 
as an instrument of self-defense. As per Judge Weeramantry‘s 
dictum in a dissenting opinion rendered in a case before the 
ICJ: 
“… [with] nuclear war, the quality of measurability 
ceases. Total devastation admits of no scales or 
measurement. We are in  a territory where the principle 
of proportionality becomes devoid of meaning.‖36
The cumulative effect  of these arguments is to fu rther 
call into question the validity of nuclear deterrence theory as a 
rationale for the acquisition or retention of nuclear weapons 
armory.
37
 This is by virtue of the inherent paradox which is
implicit in nuclear deterrence strategy – to wit, the threat of 
the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against any ‗first 
strike‘ aggressor; and the impossibility of attaining 
proportionality in the event of a retaliatory nuclear strike in  
pursuit of this self-defense posture. Furthermore, a  probing 
examination of nuclear deterrence theory reveals two strategic 
layers of defense policy. The first of these is the expressly 
stated policy aspiration of discouraging a nuclear first strike 
by a potential adversary – i.e. dissuasion, or the use of nuclear 
threat, as a preventative measure. Beyond this first layer lies  a 
second which is represented by the implicit logic of a 
retaliatory nuclear strike in the event of an actual nuclear first 
strike by an aggressor (i.e . in the event of the failure o f the 
first layer policy of deterrence). 
However, the end result of the actual use of nuclear 
weapons in a retaliatory strike would not be limited to 
repelling the act of aggression, but would rather entail the 
‗mutually  assured destruction‘ or annihilation  of both 
belligerents. Viewed from this perspective, a self-defense 
strategy founded on nuclear deterrence theory engenders the 
genuine prospect of a nuclear apocalypse. Nuclear deterrence 
strategy thus implies in reality a security strategy which is 
ultimately  grounded on vengeful retaliation or retribution ; 
moreover, it could even lead to a pre-emptive nuclear first 
strike in  an atmosphere of escalating political tensions. The 
political language of nuclear disputes such as that pitting the 
United States against North Korea, both in terms of the tone 
and lexicon employed by both parties, would seem to validate 
this viewpoint; this has particularly been the case with the 
incendiary and vengeful language often employed by the 
North Korean government of Kim Jong-un as part of its 
declared nuclear deterrence posture. Incidentally, the use of 
excessively belligerent language and gestures (for example, 
the firing  of test missiles over the air space of neighboring 
countries or resort to apocalyptic threats such as the sabre-
rattling rhetoric employed by former Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against the State of Israel), could  per 
se constitute the basis of a war crime charge under the ICC 
Statute - to wit, ―declaring that no quarter will be given‖ 38 - if
subsequently consummated by the actus reus  element of an 
actual nuclear strike. 
It could thus be argued that nuclear deterrence theory is 
ultimately premised on a punitive expedition (in the form of 
either a pre-emptive strike or retaliatory response to a first 
strike), as opposed to a war strategy founded on principled 
self-defense. It could further be argued that embedded in 
nuclear deterrence theory is thus the seed for the mens rea of a 
putative war crime. It is this perspective which a  fortiori lends 
credence to arguments in favor of nuclear disarmament, thus 
representing a further validation of the advocacy for nuclear 
non-proliferation and global denuclearization.   
Compliance with IHL principles and ‗ jus in bello‘ 
restrictions imposed on the conduct of armed conflict are self-
evidently far more attainable with  the use of conventional 
weapons than WMDs, including nuclear weapons. Following 
our exp loration of the theoretical basis for a potential breach 
of IHL princip les in the context o f the possession or use of 
nuclear weapons, the discussion in this  section concludes with 
an examination of the residual question relating to the 
formulat ion of a war crime charge and the evidentiary burden 
of proof required fo r this prosecutorial exercise in the context 
of nuclear weapons.  
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A. Nuclear weapons and the „war crime‟ categorization:
specific elements of the crime.
Having already posited arguments on the question 
regarding the mens rea component for a putative war crime, it  
is necessary to point out that the complementary actus reus 
element for establishing the commission of the crime would  
stem from an  actual detonation of a nuclear device. Exercising 
the evidentiary burden of proof would require applying the 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
39
 in 
combination with Article 5 (jurisdiction of the ICC) of the 
Rome Statute.
40
   It would further require identifying and
establishing a specific element of the alleged war crime under 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute. Discharging the burden of proof 
would require the war crimes prosecutor to establish a direct 
or causal link between the catastrophic, widespread and 
indiscriminate impacts of the detonation of a nuclear device to 
one or more of the specific war crime charges under Article 8. 
The following constitute an illustrative (as opposed to an 
exhaustive) list of possible offences under Article 8, perceived 
in the context of nuclear warfare:  
 wilfu l killing or wilfully causing great suffering, or
serious injury to the body and health of persons
protected under the Geneva Conventions ;
41
 extensive destruction of property … not justified by
military necessity;
42
 intentionally directing attacks against civilians or
against individual civ ilians who were not exercising a
DPH function at the time of the attack, or
intentionally directing attacks against civilian
objects;
43
  (i.e. breach of the IHL princip le of 
distinction).
 intentionally d irecting attacks against personnel,
material or facilit ies involved in humanitarian
assistance or peace keeping missions;
44
 intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge
that such (a nuclear) attack would cause incidental 
loss of life or in jury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects or widespread, long term and severe damage
to the natural environment in disproportion to the 
overall military advantage to be gained from such an
attack;
45
 (i.e. breach of the IHL principle of 
proportionality).
 attacking or bombarding … settlements or buildings
and habitations which are undefended and are not
military objects;
46
 and,
 the use of poison or poisoned weapons47 (war crimes
liab ility in th is case would arise from the associated
radioactive fallout which follows the detonation of a
nuclear bomb and its harmful effects on the human
and natural environments).
The perceptible synergy between the specific components 
of a war crime charge enshrined in Article 8 and the 
indiscriminate and disproportionate impacts stemming from 
the use of nuclear weapons in warfare would  even seem to 
suggest that a war crime in the context of nuclear war could 
per se take the fo rm of a strict liability o ffence. This would  by 
virtue of the element of foreseeability associated with these 
various elements of the crime under Article 8 if nuclear 
weapons or other WMDs were to be employed in warfare. It is 
therefore posited that the following would comprise the 
defining components of a war crime categorization founded on 
the concept of strict liability:  
(a) the inevitability of the types of harm that would
ensue from the use of a nuclear weapon; and
(b) foreseeability o f the legal consequences (under 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC) emanating
from such an internationally proscribed harm.
In the absence of strict liability, a fau lt-based prosecution 
would entail a combination of the foreseeability criterion 
together with the possession and stockpiling of nuclear  
weapons. This combination would make a strong case in 
establishing the required mens rea, with the actual launching 
and detonation of the nuclear device providing the actus reus 
element which consummates the war crime 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The discourse in this paper has highlighted the strategic and 
tactical challenges faced by regular forces when confronted 
with asymmetric and hybrid forms of warfare. The focus of 
the discussion centered on the IHL implications of strategic 
and tactical responses by regular forces to these challenges, 
most notably in the form of counter-insurgency and covert 
operations including the use of signature policies to combat  
terror suspects and presumed combatants. Based on the 
discussion the following recommendations can be posited: 
 There is a need for more clarity on the classification
and use of signature policies, both regarding their
legality and the manner of their implementation. In
all cases of doubt, the presumption of civilian status
should take precedence, together with the non-lethal 
alternative of arrest and prosecution of the suspect. 
Hybrid status and potentially illegal policies need re-
examining and redefining. It is also essential to
address the problem relating to the quantum and
quality of information required for targeting.
 There should be an embedded process permitting the
standardisation of civil claims  for compensation in
all p rosecutions relating to war crimes, such that 
civil litigation becomes a common feature of IHL -
thus expanding the remit of IHL beyond its current 
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narrow focus on criminal proceedings. In this regard 
the reparations to victims award of 24 March 2017 
by the International Criminal Court in the case of 
The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga
48
 represents a 
ground breaking precedent which is to be 
commended. There is increasingly trend pointing 
towards an appreciable convergence between the 
criminal (punitive) and civil (reparations) aspects  in 
the progressive development of the jurisprudence of 
the ICC, as evidenced by the subsequent case of The 
Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi Al Mahdi.
49
 Futher 
progress in this direction will require the creation of 
a more enabling and permissive judicial environment 
through the removal of all procedural obstacles and 
substantive barriers to the institution of civil claims 
by war v ictims, most notably through the adoption of 
less rigid requirements for locus standi in both 
national courts and international tribunals. 
 There should be a proscription under IHL of all
forms of warfare which by their very nature involve
indiscriminate targeting of civilians and civilian
objects, such that such wars become illegal by virtue
of being unjustified under jus ad bellum and also by
virtue of the nature in which they are conducted (jus
in bello). This ban should equally extend to the
perfid ious use of civilians and civ ilian objects by
combatants as human shields.
IX. CONCLUSION
The nature of warfare as conceived by both Clausewitz and 
Rousseau (and largely informed by the positivist, structuralist 
Westphalian construct) has undergone significant change over 
time. It  now presents diverse evolutionary traits in the form of 
asymmetric and hybrid armed conflicts. It  has even been 
argued that Clausewitz‘s concept of war suffer from three 
main limitations in the modern era: these are in the form of 
nuclear warfare; transnational constabulary warfare (i.e. 
asymmetric and hybrid conflicts which challenges the notion 
of war as a state activity); and, the changing nature of 
statecraft itself which may render symmetry unachievable 
even in State-on-State warfare
50
 due to increasing inequalities
is state power. Concerning nuclear warfare, it is axiomatically  
the case that the peculiar conflict environment of the 21
st
century presents complex (if not entirely new) challenges for 
IHL. Society-changing weapons (or weapons of mass 
destruction – WMDs) have the potential to seriously 
undermine the principle of d istinction. It is thus submitted 
(given their inherently indiscriminate impacts) that the mere 
production, possession or stockpiling of such weapons (i.e. 
nuclear, b iological and chemical weapons) ought to  be 
construed as constituting the mens rea, or animus belligerendi, 
of preparation for the possible future commission of a war 
crime. 
It was with remarkable foresight that Clausewitz, when  
articulating the principles which he believed should govern the 
conduct of warfare, concluded his précis with the following 
observation: ―Every age has its own kind of war, its own 
limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions‖51 . 
However, the evolutionary trends witnessed in the nature and 
character of armed conflicts over the ages do not appear to 
have been matched by corresponding developments in IHL 
which has remained apparently unresponsive to the challenges 
of the new war environment - with its norms seemingly  
embalmed and entombed in  customary international law, and 
in the Geneva conventions . These, norms, conceived as they 
were for what could be described as ‗gentlemen‘s wars‘ are 
now tested to the limit  by the new breed of warfare.   The very  
advent of signature strike policies, conceived and 
implemented on the basis of unilateralism, raises serious 
questions concerning the dynamis m and efficacy of IHL 
norms in responding to the challenges of the new type of 
modern warfare.  
It could well be argued that, notwithstanding their 
increasing numbers and frequency, asymmetric and hybrid 
warfare are not a completely new or unknown phenomenon to 
IHL. Such an argument would be further grounded on the 
premise that foundational norms of jus in bello such as 
―elementary considerations of humanity‖ together with the 
principle of d istinction provide the yardstick for the conduct of 
all types of armed conflicts. As Clausewitz h imself observed 
war is after all, and by necessity, a continuation of politics (or 
policy) by other means.  
In concluding, an indelib le feature of modern armed  
conflicts is that allegations concerning serious violations of 
IHL, including the possible commission of war crimes , 
abound as a consequence of belligerent act ivities conducted in 
the ‗fog of war‟. Th is fact underlines, more than ever, the 
necessity to attain greater clarity in the conception, articulation 
and battlefield implementation of the rules of engagement. 
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